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A New Look 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff and John N. Morris 
Perhaps no single statistic raises more concern about postwar changes in the 
U.S. family than the proportion of the elderly living alone. Since 1940, the 
proportion  of  unmarried  noninstitutionalized  elderly  living  alone has  risen 
from less than 25 percent to over 60 percent. For the old old, those over 85, 
the proportion has increased from 13 percent to 57 percent (Sandefur and Tuma 
1987). The proportion of the old old living in institutions has also increased 
dramatically; in  1940, only 7 percent of  those over 85 lived in institutions; 
today’s figure is almost 25 percent. Part of  the reason the current elderly are 
much less likely to live with children is simply that they had relatively few 
children and that they have outlived some or all of their children. In 1940, for 
each person age 80 and over there were four people age 60-65.  In 1985, for 
each person age 80 and over there were fewer than two people age 60-65. 
When the baby boomers are in their 80s, there will be only one person age 
60-65  for each baby boomer (Current Population Reports  1984). 
While demographics appear to explain much  of  the change in the living 
arrangements of the elderly, the rising income of the elderly is viewed by many 
as the chief or at least a chief reason why the elderly live alone. This argument 
has been made by Beresford and Rivlin (1966), Carliner (1975), Chevan and 
Korson (1972), Kobrin (1976a,  1976b), Soldo and Lauriat (1976), Michael, 
Fuchs, and Scott (1980), Tissure and McCoy (1981), and Wolf (1984). One 
difficulty in interpreting these studies is that they fail to control for charac- 
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teristics of  children. Since incomes of  parents and children are correlated, the 
measured effects of parents’ income on living arrangements may be capturing, 
at least in part, the influence of children’s incomes. In contrast to the standard 
view,  it  may  be  that  increases  in  children’s  incomes  have  lowered  the 
likelihood of shared living. The fact that more than half the aged living with 
their  children  are themselves  the  homeowners (Schorr  1980) suggests  that 
many adult children live with their elderly parents for financial reasons. 
This study uses  new  data  on the characteristics  of  the  elderly  and  their 
children to study the effects of children’s and parents’ income as well as other 
characteristics  on the  shared  living  decision.  The new  data  are  the  1986 
HRCA  Elderly  Survey and  the  1986 HRC-NBER Child  Survey. The  1986 
HRCA Elderly  Survey  is part of  an ongoing panel  survey of the elderly  in 
Massachusetts  that is being conducted  by the Hebrew  Rehabilitation Center 
for the Aged (HRCA). The 1986 HRC-NBER Child Survey is an interview of 
the  children  of  those  elderly  who participated  in  the  1986 HRCA  Elderly 
Survey. 
The research reported here considers 297 cases of  elderly parents who have 
a single living child. Our first approach to studying the living arrangements of 
these 297 parent-child observations is to estimate reduced-form logit and probit 
models. Estimates of  these models indicate that child characteristics  such as 
income  and  marital  status  are  as  important  as  parent  characteristics  in 
explaining  living  arrangements. The  probit  and  logit  results  point  to  the 
principal determinants of shared living, but understanding the precise role of 
income and other variables in this decision requires a structural model. Our 
second approach is thus to develop and estimate a structural model of shared 
living. The model trades off the economies to scale in shared living against the 
(potential) disutility of parents and children from living together.  Analysis of 
the  model indicates  that, regardless  of  the precise  form of  preferences, the 
decision concerning shared living is economically  separate from the decision 
concerning how much housing the parent and child should purchase and how 
much the parent and child should each consume; that is, living arrangements 
can  be  studied  without  simultaneously  specifying  the  precise  nature  of 
parent-child bargaining. The model also clarifies how the parent’s and child’s 
income  jointly affect the shared living decision. In contrast to the logit or probit 
specifications,  in the  structural model the effects of  increases  in income of 
either the parent or the child depend on the parent’s and child’s preferences 
regarding  living  together.  By  introducing  error terms in  the  model,  these 
preferences can be estimated. The error terms in the model are specified quite 
naturally as unobserved  (to the econometrician) taste parameters  concerning 
shared living. 
The paper  proceeds  in  sections  5.1  and  5.2 with  a  presentation  of  the 
structural model and an analysis of how changes in parent and child incomes 
affect the decision to live together. Section 5.3 demonstrates how the model 
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HRC-NBER surveys, summarize some general  findings  from the  two new 
surveys, and present cross-tabulations from our sample of 297 parents and their 
single children. Section 5.8 presents probit and logit models of the choice of 
the elderly  to  live with children, to live in an  institution, or to  live alone. 
Section  5.9  reports  and  interprets  maximum  likelihood  estimates  of  the 
structural model. Finally, section 5.10 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
5.1  A Model of Family Living Arrangements 
Consider a single surviving parent who has only one child. Let Up  and U, 
stand, respectively,  for parent  and  child preferences  over goods,  housing 
services, and living arrangements. If the parent and child live alone, the parent 
maximizes Up,  and the child maximizes U,.  When they choose to live together, 
they are assumed to maximize U,.  (given in [ l]),  which is a weighted average 
of  their preferences, where the weight 8 that is chosen by the parent and child 
reflects the outcome of  parent-child bargaining: 
(1)  u, = our  + (1 - 8)UC 
This is a general expression for family  preferences  in the case of  shared 
living since 8 can take  any value between  zero and  unity.  Formulating  the 
problem in this manner only restricts the solution to be efficient; that is, the 
maximization of  U,.  subject to the collective family (parent and child) budget 
produces a Pareto-efficient solution, and all Pareto-efficient solutions to the 
shared living choice problem can be represented  as the maximand of  U, for 
a particular  choice of the utility  weight 8. 
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas characterization  of  Up  and U,: 
In (2), C,,  and C,  are the respective  levels of  consumption of  the parent and 
child, while H,  and H,  are the respective  housing  services enjoyed  by  the 
parent and child. The coefficients A  and B describe the parent’s and child’s 
preferences for shared living. If the parent and child live apart, A and B both 
equal unity; if they live together, A or B can be greater than, equal to, or less 
than unity, depending on whether the parent and child enjoy living together, 
are indifferent to shared housing, or prefer living apart. We  are particularly 
interested in cases in which A > 1 and B < 1,  or vice versa; that is, when one 
family member prefers living together and the other prefers living apart. 
We  first consider the maximization  of  (1) for given values of  8 and then 
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child choose to live together. When the parent and child live together, their 
combined budget is 
(3)  C, + C, + 4H  = Y,  + Y, 
In (3), 4 stands for the relative price of housing services, and Yp  and Y, are 
the incomes of the parent and child, respectively. H stands for the quantity of 
housing services jointly consumed by the parent and child; that is, equation (3) 
incorporates the assumption  that housing services are a public good that can 
be  simultaneously  consumed  by  both  the  parent  and  the  child  without 
congestion. While one could assume some marginal congestion from shared 
housing, which could be modeled as a higher effective price of H,  as long as 
the effective price of H is less than 2q there is an economic incentive for shared 
housing.  In this study, we assume zero marginal congestion. 
The economic gain from shared housing, which is modeled here as a lower 
effective price of housing, is compared with the disutility from shared housing 
(in which case A and/or B will be less than unity) in determining whether the 
parent and child will live together. More precisely, the parent and child each 
compare their utility when they live together with their utility if they live alone. 
The necessary condition for shared living is that both the parent and the child 
be at least as well off living together as they would be if they lived apart. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the parent-child utility possibility frontier from shared 
living. The point Q lies outside the frontier. If the utilities of the parent and 
child from living apart are given by point Q,  the two will choose to live apart. 
If, on the other hand, separate living produced utility levels indicated by point 
R, the parent and child can do better by living together. The assumption that 
when they  live together  the child  and parent choose efficient and  mutually 
advantageous  levels  of  housing  and  consumption  means  that  the  utility 
I 
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outcome lies on the frontier between and including points R,  and R, . At one 
extreme, point R, ,  the parent receives all the gains from shared housing, while 
at the other extreme, R, ,  all gains go to the child, and the parent is no better 
off than if he or she lived alone. Points on the frontier between R,  and R, 
involve both the parent and the child sharing the gains from living together. 
The choice of the weight 8 used in maximizing (1) subject to (3)  determines 
the point chosen on the utility possibility  frontier. 
While the exact point chosen on the frontier requires an explicit specification 
of  the child-parent  bargaining  process, the decision  to live together  can be 
examined without any reference to the specific bargaining solution. Given the 
assumption that efficient bargaining occurs, one can decide whether the parent 
and child live together simply by determining whether their utility position if 
they live apart lies inside or outside the utility possibility frontier available if 
they live together. This is a general proposition  that holds regardless of the 
precise form of preferences.  In terms of equations (I) and (3),  one need show 
only that there is a range of values of  8 that, when used in (I), imply a Pareto 
improvement over living apart. Knowledge of the particular value of 8 actually 
chosen is  not  required.  The fact  that one can  study  living  arrangements 
independently from studying nonaltruistic parent-child decision making (bar- 
gaining) is a great advantage since estimating this process would place greater 
demands on the data. 
A simple procedure for determining whether the utility position from living 
apart lies inside or outside the frontier involves calculating two critical values 
of 8, 8,  and 8,.  8,  is the value of 8 that if used in maximizing (1) subject to 
(3)  leaves the parent  with the same utility  from shared  living as he or she 
receives  from  living  alone;  8,  is  defined  symmetrically  for  the  child.  If 
€Ip  = Oc, the  utility  position  from living apart  lies  on  the  utility  frontier 
available if they live together. If 8,  > 8,  ,  then the utility position from living 
apart lies inside the frontier. If 8,  > 8,,  the utility position from living apart 
lies outside the frontier. To see this, note that, if 8,  > 8,  ,  the choice of 8 2  8, 
produces a lower level of utility for the child than he or she enjoys from living 
alone, while choosing 8 < 8,  produces a lower level of utility for the parent 
than is available from living alone. 
The conditions under which 8,  = 8,  are of interest because they indicate 
the  circumstances in  which  the  parent  and child  would  be just indifferent 
between living together and living apart. As demonstrated  below, given Yp , 
Y, ,  and q, the condition 8,  = 8,  (the utility position from living apart is on 
the frontier) occurs for combinations of the utility parameters A and B defined 
by a function G(A, B) = 0. Hence, the conditions under which the parent and 
child choose to live together can be expressed in terms of  critical values of 
thepreferences (A and B)  of the parent and child regarding shared living. While 
the preference parameters A and B are not observed, their determinants can be 
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Maximization  of  (1)  subject to  (3) yields the following  demand relations 
when the parent and child live together: 
(4) 
OA Y 
[OA + (1 -  O)B]2 ’  c, = 
Y  H=- 
29 ’ 
BY 
[0A + (1 - 0)R]2  ’  c,.  = (1 - 0) 
where  Y  = Y,  + Y,. . Note  that  the  demand for housing  services, in  this 
formulation, is independent of the bargaining solution, 8. Larger values of 0, 
the weight applied to the parent’s preferences, means more parent consumption 
(larger C,)  and less consumption by the child (smaller C,.). Without loss of 
generality, we measure H  in units such that q  =  1/4. 
The indirect utility functions of the parent, V,,  ,  and child, V,  , from shared 
living are given by 
v,  = log 
V‘  = log  {[OA + (1 -  O)B] 
The indirect utilities of  the parent  and child from living alone, V,, and  V, , 
respectively, are 
The critical  values of  0,  O,, , such that  Vf, =  Vii, and 8, , such that  V, = 
V: ,  are given by 
(7) 
BY? 
AY2 + (B -  A]YFA  ‘  0,  = 
BY2 -  BY:/B 
0‘.  = 
(A -  B)Y,Z’B + BY2 ’ 
From (7), one can show that SOJSA  < 0 and 6(  1 -  O)/SB < 0; the smaller 
the parent’s disutility from shared living, the smaller is the critical weight 0, 
that leaves the parent indifferent between living apart and living together. The 
critical  child  weight,  1 - 8,. , is correspondingly  negatively  related  to the 
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Equating 0,  and BC provides the relation G(A, B)  = 0 given in (8). Values 
of A and B satisfying G(A, B)  = 0 leave the parent and the child indifferent 
between living together and living apart. If G(A, B)  > 0, the parent and child 
choose to live together. They choose to live apart if G(A, B)  < 0. Note that 
the asymptotes of the G(  2 log Yp/log (Y2 - 1)  and 
B = 2 log Yc/log(Y2 - 1). When Y,  becomes very large relative to Y,,  A 
approaches one, and B approaches one when Y, becomes very large relative 
) function occur at A 
to Yp. 
(8)  P  G(A, B)  = Y2 - YFB -  YuA = 0. 
Along the locus defined by G(A, B) = 0, we have 
(9) 
Figure 5.2 graphs the values of A and B  satisfying (8). The point D defined 
by A = 1, B = 1, lies above the  G(A, B)  = 0 locus  and involves shared 
living.  To  see this, one need  only observe from (7) that, when A =  1 and 
B = 1, 0,/0,  = Yi/(Yi + 2YpYc)  < 1, which  is the condition for shared 
living. Combinations of A and B lying northeast of  the G(A, B)  = 0 locus 
satisfy  G(A, B)  > 0  and  entail  shared  living,  while  combinations  lying 
southwest of the locus satisfy G(A,  B)  < 0 and entail separate living. Consider 
points in which the parent prefers to live together (A > 1)  and the child prefers 
to live alone (B  < 1).  As Yp  rises relative to Y,,  the G(A, B)  curve approaches 
a  vertical  line  at  A = 1  leaving  all  such  points  in  the  area  for  which 
G(A,  B)  > 0. Hence, when parents prefer living together, but their children do 
1  B 
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not,  they  are  able eventually  to bribe their  children  if  their incomes are 
sufficiently high relative to their children. The opposite situation in which the 
child’s preferences always dominate arises when Y, is very very large relative 
to Y,. 
5.2  Income Effects and Living Arrangements 
The G(A,  B)  function can be used to analyze the effect of increases in the 
parent’s or child’s income on the decision to live together. The technique is to 
consider  how  income  changes  shift  the  G(A,  B)  = 0  locus.  The 
G*(A,  B) = 0 and G**(A,  B)  = 0 loci in  figure 5.3 are examples of  such 
shifts. Given a distribution of family pairs of A and B in the population, the 
G*(  )  locus clearly involves less shared living than the G(  ) locus since all 
A,  B pairs lying between the two curves now involve living apart. 
The G**(A,  B) = 0 locus, on the other hand, involves less living together 
among families in which both the child and the parent dislike shared living 
(A < 1)  but possibly more shared living in cases in which either the parent or 
the child prefers living together  (A > 1 or B > 1). 
To examine shifts in the G(A,  B)  locus, we consider the implicit function 
A  = F(B,  Y,,  Y,) defined by G(A,  B) = 0 and determine how this function 
changes with  changes in  Yp and  Y,,  holding  B  constant. For  example,  if 
changes in  the function  F(  )  arising  from a particular income change are 
positive at each level of B,  the G(A,  B)  curve shifts outward. We first consider 
the effect of a uniform proportional increase in Yp  and Y, . Let A represent a 
positive factor multiplying  Yp  and Y,.  Equation (10) presents  the derivative 
6A/6A = 6F(B,  AY,,  AY,)/SA  evaluated  at  A = 1 and  values  of  A  and  B 
satisfying G(A,  B) = 0. 
1  B 
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This  derivative  is  clearly  positive  for  A < 1  and  B < 1.  Hence,  equal 
proportional  increases in Y,,  and Y, reduce  shared living among families  in 
which both the parent and the child dislike living together (A < 1 and B < 1). 
On the other hand, among families where there is disagreement about shared 
living (A > 1 and B < 1 or B > 1 and A < l), such income increases may 
or may not increase shared living. 
We  next consider how redistribution  from the child to the parent shifts the 
G(A,  B) = 0 locus. This derivative, which holds Y constant and raises Yp  by 
the same amount, +, that Y, is lowered is given by 
This derivative is negative if A > B and Yp < Y,.  Hence, among families in 
which the parent is relatively poor and has a relative preference for living with 
the child, redistribution  from the child to the parent  increases  the extent of 
shared living.  In terms of  figure 5.2, such redistribution  leads to a counter- 
clockwise rotation of the G(A,  B) = 0 locus. 
Finally, we consider changes in the G(A,  B) = 0 locus arising from changes 
in the income of one family member, holding constant the income of the other 
member. Equation (12) examines the effect of  raising Y,,: 
This derivative is negative for values of A 3  1 and is positive for sufficiently 
small  values  of  A. Hence,  a  rise in  the  income of  the parent  produces  a 
counterclockwise  rotation  in  the  G(A, B) = 0  locus,  thereby  raising  the 
frequency of  shared living among families whose parents prefer living with 
their children  (A > 1) and reducing  the frequency  of  shared living  among 
families whose parents prefer to live apart (A < 1).  Increases  in the child’s 
income, holding the parent’s income constant, produce a clockwise rotation in 
the  G(A,  B) = 0 curve, giving  more  weight  to the  child’s  preferences  in 
determining living arrangements. 
To  summarize, in the  structural  model  the effects of  income changes on 
living arrangements depend in a nonlinear manner on the relative incomes of 
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from the implicit assumption in logit and probit specifications that the effects 
of  income changes are the same sign regardless of  the particular parent-child 
observation in question. 
5.3  Empirical Specification 
Preferences toward living arrangements are likely to differ greatly across as 
well as within families.  Hence, it seems reasonable to model the preference 
parameters  A  and B  as depending partly on observable characteristics  and 
partly on unobservable  (at least to the econometrician) components. Specif- 
ically, we assume that A  and B can be represented  as 
(13)  A  = oc,X,  + pP , 
B  = cY,x,. + pc  . 
In (13), Xp  and X,.  are vectors of characteristics determining the parent’s and 
child’s preferences, respectively. 
The terms p,  and p,.  in (13) are random errors, which, to  simplify  the 
exposition, are  assumed here  to be  independent  standard  normal  deviates. 
Referring  to figure  5.2, the  likelihood  that  a  parent  and  child  live  apart 
corresponds to the probability that  CIA, B)  is negative, which is given by 
(14)  P[G(A,  B)  < 01  =  P(A = A*)P[G(A*,  B)  < O]dA* 
--?c  i 
From  figure  5.2,  for  values  of  A  below  the  horizontal  asymptote  A, G 
(A,  B)  is negative. Hence, we can write (14) as 
P[G(A,  B)  < 01  = F(A - &,,X,) 
% 
In (15), F(  ) 
stands for the  standard  normal  density  function.  The probability  of  living 
together  is simply  1 - P[G(A,  B)  < 01.  These expressions can be used  to 
form the likelihood of observing a sample of parents some of whom live with 
their children and some of whom do not. Hence, the parameter vectors ap  and 
a, can  be  estimated  by  maximum  likelihood.  Note  that  this  probability 
statement is quite different from the standard reduced-form logit specification 
that  one might  posit.  For  example, parent’s  income enters  in  a  complex, 
nonlinear  fashion  in  the  probability  statement,  and  its  influence  on  the 
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probability of shared living interacts with the level of  the child’s income and 
the parent’s and child’s preferences  for shared living. 
5.4  The Data 
As mentioned, this paper uses data from the 1986  HRCA Elderly Survey and 
the 1986 HRC-NBER Child Survey. The former survey was conducted by the 
Hebrew Rehabilitation  Center for the  Aged  (HRCA), while  the  latter  was 
conducted by the authors and HRCA. The 1986 HRCA Elderly Survey is part 
of an ongoing panel  survey of Massachusetts  elderly that began in  1982. In 
addition to the 1982 and 1986 surveys, the elderly sample was reinterviewed 
in 1984, 1985, and 1987. The 1986 HRC-NBER Child Survey is a survey of 
the children of those elderly interviewed in the  1986 HRCA Elderly Survey. 
One child of  each elderly respondent was interviewed and asked a set of ques- 
tions concerning his (her) household, his (her) parents, and his (her) siblings. 
The original 1982 stratified sample of  3,856 elderly individuals was drawn 
from two populations. The first population (the community sample), account- 
ing for 2,674 of the elderly in the total sample, was drawn from communities 
in  Massachusetts. The second  population  (the health  care sample), which 
accounts for the remaining  1,  I82 elderly in the 1982 survey, was drawn from 
elderly  participants  of  all  twenty-seven  Massachusetts  home  health  care 
corporations. Both samples were stratified to produce an overrepresentation of 
the older old. The sample’s selection is described in more detail in Kotlikoff 
and Morris (1989) and Morris et al. (1987). The 1982 sample of  the elderly 
included only the noninstitutionalized elderly, but each subsequent survey has 
followed the initial sample as they changed residences, including moving into 
and out from nursing homes. 
Each of  the HRCA Elderly Surveys includes detailed questions about living 
arrangements and  health  status.  The  1986 reinterview  of  the  elderly  also 
contains  a  series  of  questions of  the  elderly about  their  children.  These 
questions include the names, sexes, and locations of all children, frequency 
and type of  contact with children, the extent of  financial aid  given  to  and 
received from children, and the amount of assistance given by children to their 
elderly parents in performing activities of  daily living. In addition, the 1986 
survey contains a set of questions about the elderly respondent’s income and 
wealth. 
At the close of the HRCA Elderly Survey, we asked elderly respondents in 
the  community sample for permission  to  contact one of  their  children  to 
conduct our Child Survey. While we would have preferred to randomly select 
the child to be interviewed, we felt that we would receive more cooperation 
if  we  allowed  the  parent  to  make  the  selection. Like  the  HRCA  Elderly 
Surveys, the HRC-NBER  Child Survey is a telephone interview. The Child 
Survey  is roughly  forty-five  minutes  in length. Interviews with the child’s 160  Laurence J. KotlikofflJohn N. Morris 
spouse were conducted if the child was unavailable. The questions in the Child 
Survey concerning the respondent’s  characteristics  include age, geographic 
location, marital status, number of young children, work and health status, 
occupation, industry, education, grades in high school, income, and wealth. 
These questions are also asked of the respondent about his or her siblings. In 
addition, the child was asked to indicate (1) the frequency of contact between 
each sibling  and  each  sibling’s spouse and  the  HRCA  elderly  respondent 
parent, (2) the amount of financial assistance each sibling and his spouse give 
to or receive from the HRCA elderly respondent parent, and (3) the amount 
of  time  each  sibling  and  his  spouse  spends  helping  the  HRCA  elderly 
respondent. The child was also asked about his parents’ health status as well 
as his parents’ income and net wealth. 
The sample size of the initial 1982 Elderly Survey is 3,856. In contrast, the 
1986 completed sample size of elderly was 2,889, with most of the attrition 
since 1982 due to deaths. In the 1986 data, over 90 percent of the elderly are 
above  age 70,  over 40  percent  are the  old  old  (above age  85), and  over 
two-thirds are females. The size of  the HRC-NBER Child Survey is 850. Of 
these 850 children, 341 have no living siblings. In this study, we consider these 
341  children  with  no  siblings  and  their  elderly  parents  who  were  also 
interviewed  in  1986. Of  the 341 single childiparent  observations, 297 have 
complete data. The remaining 45 observations are missing data, typically on 
the income of either the child, the elderly parent(s), or both. 
5.5  Some Initial Findings from the 1986 HRCA Elderly Survey and 
the HRC-NBER Child Survey 
Since the 297 observations examined here represent only a portion of  the 
data, it may be useful to summarize some of the initial findings reported in 
Kotlikoff  and  Morris  (1  989)  based  on  the  entire  1986 Elderly  and  Child 
Surveys. These data paint a bimodal picture of contact and assistance of  the 
elderly  by  their  children,  with  a  majority  of  elderly  receiving  significant 
attention and care and a significant minority receiving little or no attention or 
care. Clearly,  the realities  of  demographics limit the potential  support that 
children can provide parents. Over one-fifth of the HRCA elderly in 1986 had 
no children, and another fifth have only one child. Elderly couples are more 
likely to have children  than  the  single elderly; over a quarter of  the single 
elderly  have  no children.  Daughters are  often  viewed  as  more  important 
providers of care to the elderly than sons. But, in total, 40.5 percent of the 
elderly have either no daughters or just one daughter, and over half the elderly 
either have no daughters or have no daughters who live within an hour. 
Only 13.1 percent of  all elderly and only 15.4 percent of vulnerable elderly 
live with their children. Of those elderly with children, fewer than one-fifth 
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and over 40 percent of  single elderly males and females who were deemed 
vulnerable based on an ADL ability score live completely alone. The fraction 
of respondents in institutions in 1986 is 11.8 percent for the entire sample and 
over 25 percent for the vulnerable elderly. Taken together these figures suggest 
only modest  support of the elderly by children in the form of  shared living 
quarters. 
The geographic  location  of  parents  obviously  limits their  access to  their 
children.  Over one-third  of  the elderly  either have  no children  or have  no 
children who live within an hour. Despite their health problems, the vulnerable 
elderly are only slightly more likely to live with or near their children. Of those 
elderly who have children but are not living with them, only 44.6 percent have 
more than  one child  within  an hour.  In  a typical  month, over a quarter of 
children of  the elderly  do not physically  spend time with their children; in 
contrast, almost a quarter of children, including those living with the HRCA 
elderly, spent over thirty hours in the previous month in physical contact. 
While physical contact may, in some instances, be limited, most elderly with 
children have some form of contact, be it telephone contact or visits, during 
the week. Of the elderly with children, 84 percent either live with their children 
or have daily or weekly contact with one or more children. The institution- 
alized, the group with perhaps the greatest need for child contact, sometimes 
receive  the least attention.  Almost one-third of  the institutionalized  elderly 
either have no children or have very little contact with their children over the 
course of a year. For the noninstitutionalized, the corresponding fraction is less 
than one-quarter. 
Although many of  the elderly in the HRCA sample are quite poor, direct 
financial support of elderly parents by children is rare. Only 3 percent of the 
HRCA  elderly  report  receiving  regular  monthly  financial  help  from their 
children. Of the elderly that are very poor (annual incomes below $5,000),  the 
corresponding percentage is only 4 percent. These figures seem surprising, and 
what is even more surprising is that there are few transfers to the poor elderly 
even in cases where there are a large number of middle- and upper-income 
children. 
5.6  Characteristics of the Selected Sample-the  Elderly 
There  are  297  elderly  respondents  in the  1986 HRCA  Elderly  Survey 
corresponding  to the 297 children. Ten percent  of  these respondents  live in 
nursing homes, 20 percent live with their children, and the rest, 70 percent, 
live alone, which in this context means either completely  alone, with their 
spouse, or with other individuals who are not their children. The 297 elderly 
respondents are typically quite old; over half, 150, are age 85 and over. For 
those age 85 and older, the proportion living in nursing homes is 16 percent, 
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alone is 61 percent. Two-thirds of the elderly are females; interestingly, only 
one of  the thirty  institutionalized  elderly  is a male. The elderly  sample is 
disproportionately  white (94 percent) and single (72 percent). 
We  have created five dummy variables to characterize the elderly respon- 
dents’ health status. These are Independent (H  l), Minor Functional Problems 
(H2), Requires Assistance with Independent Activities of Daily Living (H3), 
Requires Some Assistance with Activities of Daily Living (H4), and Requires 
Substantial  Assistance  with  Activities  of  Daily  Living  (H5).  Each  of  the 
elderly was allocated to one of these categories on the basis of responses to 
over thirty  questions  on  functional  ability,  ability  to  perform  independent 
activities of daily living, and objective information about ongoing diseases and 
infirmities.  We  also  considered  several  other  health  variables,  including 
dummies for neurological problems,  inability to move from a chair without 
assistance, and Alzheimer’s disease. These variables did not add significantly 
to the prediction of living arrangements given the dummies HI  -H5.  Of the 
thirty  institutionalized elderly,  twenty-eight  have positive H4 or H5 health 
indicators.  Of  the  fifty-eight  elderly  living  with their  children,  twelve (21 
percent) have positive H4 or H5 indicators.  Of the 209 elderly living alone, 
twenty-one (10 percent) have positive H4 or H5 indicators. 
The incomes of  the elderly are typically fairly low.  Slightly over half the 
elderly reported income below $7,500. Another 39 percent reported incomes 
between  $7,500 and $20,000.  Only  twenty-three  of  the elderly,  8 percent, 
report incomes  over $20,000.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  none  of  these 
twenty-three higher-income elderly live in nursing homes and that only two of 
the twenty-three live with their children. 
5.7  Characteristics of the Selected Sample-the  Children 
The ages of the 297 children  of  the  elderly range from  twenty-seven  to 
seventy-nine.  A  surprisingly high number,  185, of the 297 children  in the 
sample  (all of  whom  were  referred  by  the  HRCA  elderly  respondent)  are 
female. Slightly over half are younger than 55; over two-thirds are between 
ages 45 and 65. Children living with their parents tend to be somewhat older; 
19 percent of children living with parents are age 65 or older, compared to 8 
percent for children whose parents live alone. Most of the children, 76 percent, 
are married;  but, among  children  living  with  their  parents,  the  proportion 
married is only 45 percent.  Over half the children went to college, and only 
thirty of the 297 children failed to complete high school.  There is no  clear 
correlation in the raw data between child’s education and the living arrange- 
ments of the parents. 
In contrast to the parents, whose median income is approximately $7,000, 
the median income of children is approximately $30,000. A total of sixty-one 
children reported incomes above $50,000, and twenty-one reported incomes 
below $10,000. Of the sixty-one elderly whose children have incomes above 
$50,000, fifty-three, 87 percent, live alone. This figure contrasts with the 70 163  Why Don’t the Elderly Live with Their Children? 
percent figure for the overall sample. Most of the children, 85 percent, report 
their health to be good,  14 percent report their health to be fair, and only 1 
percent report their health to be poor. 
5.8  Logit and Probit Estimates 
Table 5.1  reports results for a logit model specifying the probability of living 
alone,  living in  an  institution,  and  living with  children.  The independent 
variables are the age of  the parent, Age; the sex of the parent, Male  = 1 for 
Table 5.1  Estimates from the Logit Model 
Coefficients for the Probability of 
Living in an Institution 
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a male, 0 otherwise; the marital status of the parent, Marry  =  I for married, 
0 otherwise; the income of the parent, Income; four health dummies for the 
parent, H1, H2, H3, and H4; the age of the child, KAge; the marital status of 
the  child,  Kmarry  = 1  married,  0  otherwise;  the  sex  of  the  child, 
Kmale = 1 for a male, 0 otherwise; the income of  the child, KIncome; the 
years of education of the child, KEduc; and the self-reported health status of 
the  child,  KHealth  = 1 if  the child  reported excellent  or good  health, 0 
otherwise. 
Surprisingly  few  of  the  parent  coefficients  from  the  logit  model  are 
significant, but the signs of the coefficients of parent variables generally accord 
with previous findings. In particular, higher levels of parent’s income increase 
the  probability  of  living  alone,  as  does  being  married  and  being  male. 
Compared to those elderly with severe health problems (those in the fifth health 
category), other elderly are more likely to live alone and are less likely to live 
in a nursing home. 
The new  child  variables  in  the  logit  indicate  that  those elderly  whose 
children have higher incomes, are married, or are male are more likely to live 
alone or live in an institution. Both KMarry variables are significant, as is the 
KMale coefficient in determining the probability of living alone. The KIncome 
variable in the probability of  living alone is almost significant. 
The probit model presented  in table  5.2 considers  the subsample of  267 
elderly who are not in nursing homes. As in the logit results, table 5.2  indicates 
that the probability of  living with children rather than living alone decreases 
with the parent’s and child’s income. This probability is smaller if  the child 
Table 5.2  Estimates from the Prubit Model 
Coefficients for the Probability of  Living with 
Children versus Living Alone 
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is male or if the child or parent are married. Surprisingly, the parent health 
variables are not significant, although they have the expected sign. The child 
health coefficient is also insignificant; according to the table, parents whose 
children  are in  excellent  or good health  are more  likely  to live  with  their 
children. While the age neither of the parent nor the child is significant, older 
parents are more likely to live with their children, as are parents with older 
children. Finally, parents with more educated children  are less likely to live 
with their children, although this coefficient is also insignificant. In sum, the 
logit  and  probit  coefficients,  although often insignificant,  generally  accord 
with our priors and suggest that child characteristics  are important codeter- 
minants of the living arrangements of the elderly. 
5.9  Results from Estimating the Structural Model 
The estimated  coefficients  from the structural  model  based  on the  267 
observations of children and their noninstitutionalized parents are presented in 
table 5.3. A likelihood ratio test indicates that, as a group, the coefficients are 
highly significant. The variable Health is a dummy that takes on the value one 
if the parent’s health indicator is H4 or H5 and zero otherwise. The first five 
coefficients in the table multiplied by their respective variables correspond to 
the term apXp  in (1  3), while the second five coefficients multiplied by their 
respective  variables  correspond  to the term  aCXc  in  (13). Hence,  positive 
coefficients in the table mean that the expected value of either A or B is larger, 
as is the probability of  shared living. According to the table, this probability 
is  smaller  for married  parents  or parents  with  married  children. It  is  also 
smaller if the child is male. In contrast, the probability of shared living is larger 
for male parents, older parents, parents with older children, parents with less 
well  educated  children,  and  parents  who  fall  into  the  worst  two  health 
categories. 
The  estimated  coefficients  from  the  structural  model  can  be  used  to 
determine values of afXf  and a,X,  for each observation. The mean values of 
Table 5.3  Estimates from the Structural Model 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
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apXp  and a,X,  across all observations are ,848 and .482, respectively. Since 
both  these  figures are less than  unity,  both  children  and parents  prefer,  on 
average, to live apart, but children have a stronger preference toward separate 
living. Not all parents and children  have values of  apXp  and a,X,  less than 
unity. Quite the contrary;  129 of  the 267 parents (48 percent) and sixty-four 
children (24 percent) have estimated values of a,,X,,  and ac.Xc, respectively, 
in excess of unity.  Hence, almost half of  parents and almost one-quarter of 
children appear to prefer shared living. Figure 5.4 presents the distribution of 
pairs of aPXp  and a,X,  for each parent-child pair. Points in the southeast and 
northwest quadrants indicate parent-child pairs in which there is a conflict with 
respect to preferences regarding shared living. Points in the northwest quadrant 
correspond  to  cases  in  which  parents  prefer  to  live  with  their  children 
(assuming  p.,,  = 0)  and  children  prefer  to  live  apart  from  their  parents 
(assuming  pC = 0). Points  in the southeast quadrant  correspond  to parents 
who prefer to live apart from their children but children who prefer to live with 
their parents.  Since 129 of  the 267 parents want (assuming p,,  = 0) to live 
with their children but only fifty-eight do so, it appears that a large number of 
parents live alone against their will. According to the model, if their incomes 
were sufficiently high, these parents could persuade their children to live with 
them. 
Another issue that can be explored using the model’s estimated coefficients 
is the effect on the probability of living together of changes in income. In this 
exercise, reported in table 5.4, we evaluate a,,X,,  and a,X,  at the mean values 
of X,  and X, and consider  different  combinations of  Y,,  and Y,.  The table 
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Table 5.4  Probability of Living with Children for Selected Combinations of 
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indicates that, at the mean values of  apXp  and a,X,,  significant changes in the 
probability  of living together occur only if  the child’s or parent’s income is 
fairly low. Stated differently, because the mean preferences indicate a mutual 
dislike for shared living, the income of the parent or the child must be quite 
low to produce a reasonably large probability  of  shared living. 
A related experiment is to ask how equalizing the incomes of children and 
parents,  while  keeping  the  total  constant, affects  the  probability  of  living 
together. To analyze this question, we used the estimated values of apX, and 
acXc  for each parent and child and computed the probability of shared living 
given current income positions.  We then computed the probability  based on 
equalized income. The differences in probabilities for the 267 observations are 
quite small. For  173 observations,  the probabilities changed by  less than  1 
percentage point.  For forty-four observations, the probabilities  changed by 
between 1 and 2 percentage points. For forty-one observations, the probabil- 
ities  changed  by  between  2  and  10  percentage  points;  and  for  only  two 
observations did the probabilities change by more than 10 percentage points. 
Taken together, these two experiments suggest that the intrinsic preferences 
of  the  parent  and  child regarding  shared  living  rather  than  the  relative  or 
absolute incomes of the two are most important in determining the probability 
of shared living. In terms of figure 5.1, the position of curve G(A, B)  is not 
highly sensitive to even substantial variations of  Yp  and Y, around observed 
values, and the key determinant of the living arrangement is the location of A 
and B in the axis. This finding that income effects play a rather minor role in 
determining living arrangements  is supported  as well by the probit results. 
Evaluated at the mean levels of income, which are $36,704 for children and 
$9,719 for parents,  the  probability  of  shared living  is  .170. If  the  child’s 
income is reduced from $36,704 to $12,000, the probability  of  shared living 
only  increases  to  .230.  If  the  child’s  income  is  raised  to  $65,000, the 
probability only declines to .088. Holding the child’s income at the mean, if 168  Laurence J. Kotlikoff/John N. Morris 
the parent’s income is increased to $20,000, the probability of living together 
only declines from ,170  to .I01  ;  lowering the parent’s income to $4,000 raises 
the probability to only .191. 
5.10  Summary and Conclusion 
This paper uses new data on the characteristics of  children and parents to 
study their  decision to live  together.  Theoretical analysis of  this decision 
indicates that living arrangements can be studied separately from the question 
of  child-parent bargaining.  The analysis also points out that income effects 
with respect to living arrangements are likely to be family specific; in some 
families, increases in the incomes of children or parents will lead them to live 
apart, in others to live together. 
Empirical  findings from logit and probit models as well as the structural 
model suggest that characteristics of children are important codeterminants of 
living arrangements. They also support a view that income differences are not 
as  important  as  may  previously  have  been  thought  in  explaining  living 
arrangements. 
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Comment  Axel H. Borsch-Supan 
The elderly’s choice of living arrangements is the subject of three papers in this 
volume.  My papers  and  that  by  Ellwood  and  Kane  follow the  traditional 
approach in much of the housing literature: they are empirical investigations 
of the elderly’s demand for several types of living arrangements, in particular, 
living with their own adult children as an alternative to living independently, 
on the one hand, and becoming institutionalized, on the other hand. But there 
are two sides of the market for housing as well as for living arrangements, in 
particular, two parties who make an elderly parent-adult child living arrange- 
ment possible: the elderly parent on the demand side and the adult child on the 
supply side. It is the merit of the paper by Larry Kotlikoff and John Moms to 
make this simultaneous choice explicit. 
The two sides have to match, and the likelihood of a match will depend on 
characteristics of the elderly parent as well as of the adult child. Thus, the least 
one should do is to relate all these characteristics to observed choices in some 
kind  of  reduced  form  of  the complicated matching  process.  Kotlikoff  and 
Morris are much more ambitious. They model the matching process explicitly 
and rather boldly by postulating a structural model derived from first economic 
principles.  The model  is quite  ingenious  as  it succeeds in  separating  the 
preferences of elderly parent  and adult children from the mechanics of the 
bargaining process that makes or breaks the match. This allows Kotlikoff and 
Moms essentially  to ignore  how  this bargaining  process  comes about and 
yields a fairly simple characterization of  the probability of living together that 
fits nicely in random utility theory. 
The  formalism  of  the  model  can  be  stripped  down  to  five  essential 
ingredients: two parameters that characterize the preference between privacy 
and joint living, one for the elderly, A,  and one for the child, B; the elderly’s 
income, Yp,  and the income of the child, Y,;  and a bargaining weight 8 that 
represents the elderly’s say in the joint household’s decisions. The main logic 
of  the model is as follows. If  there is a bargaining  weight 8 such that the 
resulting joint utility dominates the utility of living alone for both elderly and 
child, they will find out about it one way or another, and we, the econometric 
Axel H. Borsch-Supan is assistant professor of  Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School 
of  Government, Harvard University; C3-Professor of Economics Universitat Mannheim (West 
Germany); and faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 170  Laurence J. Kotlikoff/John N. Morris 
observers, do not have to worry about its magnitude.  We just have to check 
whether there is at least one value of 8 such that the above condition holds. 
Postulating such a model is one thing; testing it is yet another challenge. The 
authors are to be applauded for doing both. Most important, one needs a data 
set  of  elderly  and  their  living  arrangements that  includes  characteristics 
describing the elderly person und his or her adult children. As such data were 
not  available,  Kotlikoff  and Morris  collected  the data themselves, comple- 
menting a panel of  elderly in Massachusetts that was started in 1981 by Morris 
with data collected from the children. It is worth noting that this is the first, 
and it is to be hoped not the last, major data collection effort in the Economics 
of Aging Project. As the results of this paper show, more data on elderly und 
their children are badly  needed. 
The data include some 300 elderly parent-adult  child pairs of predominantly 
vulnerable elderly in Massachusetts. The authors include only elderly with one 
adult child since they decided that they should exact the burden of an additional 
interview on only one child per elderly,  a child chosen by the elderly,  not 
randomly. The restriction on elderly with only one child may well  bias the 
results as elderly with more than one child ever born are more likely to live 
jointly with one of their children. In short, this is a small, very specific, and 
possibly self-selected sample. One should keep this in mind when generalizing 
the results of this paper. 
The  authors  transform  their  behavioral  model  in  a  testable  probability 
equation  by  postulating  that the preference  parameters  A and  B  are linear 
combinations of observable characteristics such as marital status, sex, age and 
health of parent and child, denoted by the vectors X,,  andX, ,  plus unobservable 
normally distributed preference components. Utility maximization  subject to 
the budget constraint at given incomes Yp  and Y, for all possible values of the 
bargaining  weight  0 produces  an implicit  function  in A  and B, denoted  by 
G(A, B),  that characterizes the locus of indifference between living jointly and 
living  separately.  A  positive  G(A, B)  implies  living  together,  a  negative 
G(A, B)  implies  living  alone. Thus, the  G(A, B)  function  acts like  a very 
specific,  nonlinear  indirect  utility  function  in  the  familiar  random  utility 
model. The maximum likelihood estimation follows directly from this inter- 
pretation. 
Let me now turn to the empirical results. Unfortunately, after all the effort 
and  the  admirable  set-up  of  the  structural  model,  the  reader  is  rather 
disenchanted detecting only one significant coefficient in the tightly specified 
structural model.  Even if  the parameters  of  the structural model are jointly 
significant, this is the more frustrating as reduced-form logit and probit models 
produce considerably better results. The small and specific sample may explain 
the  disappointing  results, but  it  appears  to me that  these  poor  results  are 
indicators for other problems as well. 
What  distinguishes  the  reduced-form  logit  and  probit  models from  the 
structural  model?  The  key  is  the  functional  form  of  the  indirect  utility 171  Why Don’t the Elderly Live with Their Children? 
difference between living alone and living together. Logit and probit are based 
on a linear combination of the deterministic components inA and B and income 
plus unobservables: 
(1)  ~“(xp,  Xc, Yp, Yc) = apxp + acxr  +  PpYp + PcY,  +  ~p  + F,  3 
where E  is logistic in the logit model  and normal in the probit model. The 
structural model imposes a much more specific nonlinear functional form: 
(ii) 
(eq. [8] in the paper). Most notably, in the reduced-form models the effect of 
income on living arrangement choice is governed by separate parameters  pp 
and Pc,  while in the structural model income does only indirectly enter this 
choice and is consequently  “missing”  in table 5.3. (Why the  authors  also 
change some of  the X,, and X, in this table remains inconceivable.) 
The lack of freedom in the pattern and magnitude of income effects is my 
main criticism of the structural model and appears to be the most likely cause 
of  the  inferior performance relative  to the  two reduced-form models.  The 
functional  form  of  the  income  effects  result  from  one  assumption:  the 
Cobb-Douglas specification of direct utility (eq. [2])  with a common exponent 
for housing and other consumption. It restricts the budget share of housing to 
a constant 50 percent. This is rather unrealistic.  First, the share of housing 
expenditures varies widely among elderly as some live in owned homes that 
are long paid off and others in rental housing. Moreover, the sheer magnitude 
of this share is much too large. In a structural model as tightly specified as this 
one, this misspecification is rather likely to lead to a poor fit and to a bias in 
the other coefficients. 
It is worth noting that the direct utility function can easily be changed to be 
more  general  without  spoiling the  model’s  simplicity-a  utility  function 
separable in housing and consumption but withA and B affecting only housing 
and not consumption will do  the trick. I would also prefer this specification for 
other reasons-why  should the elderly (the child, respectively) enjoy all other 
consumption just as much more or less as shared housing when living jointly? 
A second, more general criticism of  the structural model is its built-in pure 
selfishness. However, asks the moralist, if there is no altruism in parent-child 
relations,  where  else should  it  be  in  this  world? Should it  not  at  least  be 
conceivable that the child has a higher utility from helping a parent who needs 
it compared to one who does not need it-for  example, by taking in a sick or 
a poor parent? None of the parent’s characteristics  such as health or income 
enter the child’s utility in this selfish model world. 
Since the structural model has no interaction between the two utilities,  the 
model  is also unable  to test the assumption of  pure selfishness.  The basic 
econometric problem  is  that  interaction  effects-say,  elements of  Xp also 
included in the exponent of Y, in (ii)-are  hard to identify, effectively only by 
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functional form. However, if interaction terms are not identified, we are back 
at  reduced  forms such as (i).  Hence,  another possible explanation  of  the 
superior performance of  the reduced-form  equations is  a certain degree of 
altruism in parent-child relations. 
In summary, it appears to me that the structural model imposes too many 
restrictions  that are not  reflected  in the data. More  flexibility in the  utility 
specification would allow for more realistic budget shares and some degree of 
altruism without  going all the  way  to reduced  forms-although  the econo- 
metric maneuvering room is tight. Notwithstanding this criticism, I admire the 
model  for its  simplicity  and  the  bold  attempt  to  cut through  the mesh  of 
bargaining and joint utility maximization. 
An important and robust result is that childrens’ characteristics matter in the 
elderly’s  choice of  living  arrangements. This  finding  should  be  a  strong 
incentive to include information on children in new surveys of the elderly such 
as the authors did for this study. 
The structural model produces a very useful categorization of elderly-child 
pairs  into four groups:  those  who agree in  either living  together  or living 
separately, and those pairs in which one partner would  like sharing but the 
other refuses to join. The possibility of this categorization is the main attraction 
of  the authors’ model, and it is a very relevant one for policy analysis.  The 
paper’s main substantive message results from this categorization. It is a sad 
message about the isolation of  the elderly in our society and worth repeating 
as it confirms a message relayed by  the other two studies on living arrange- 
ments in this volume: many elderly live alone not because they prefer to live 
alone but because their children prefer not to live with them. 